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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FLOYD WEBSTER,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

]

Appeal No. 19339

]

MARY LEHMER AND CHARLES LEHMER, ]
Defendant-Appellants.

]

REPLY OF PLAINTIFF
TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING

INTRODUCTION
This Court has asked us to respond to Mary Lehmerfs highly
emotional pro se petition for rehearing which reargues the case
from beginning to end with inappropriate first person testimony
and references to matters outside the record of this appeal.

It

is difficult to know where to begin a response to this extraordinary
document except to remind this court that there was a full trial in
this case in which the Trial Judge fully heard the testimony of
Ms. Lehmer and many other witnesses and found against her while
issuing detailed findings of fact from the bench at the conclusion
of the trial.

In addition, despite Ms. Lehmer!s references to it as

a letter "begging permission" for Floyd Webster to return the Lehmer!s
cash advance and rescind the contract, my letter of February 24, 1981,
(Exhibit 23-D) gave her the full opportunity to avoid what she now
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

now claims is the disgrace this case has brought upon her.

If the

transaction had not been so financially valuable to her at the time,
as she now claims it was not, then it is hard to see why she would
not have let "poor Floyd" rescind the purchase.

After all, it was

his own welfare that she now claims as a significant motivation for
the purchase.
Moreover, Ms. Lehmer chose to appeal the decision of the trial
court and retained eminent counsel who extensively briefed and argued
her position in this Court.

Now, six and one half years after

rejecting the solution to this case offered by my letter of February
1981 and after detailed decision by this Court rejecting the claims
of her counsel, Ms. Lehmer appears pro se to reargue the case.

But

Mary Lehmer, like other adults in our society, should be held
accountable for her wilfull and deliberate actions and as troubling
as this Court's decision and opinion in this case may be to her it
clearly was avoidable by her and could have been avoided.

She had

every opportunity to rescind or adjust this purchase from the time
of my letter on February 24, 1981, onward and the decision below
was forseeable from the outset.

Nonetheless,

Ms. Lehmer wilfully

chose to go to trial and after receiving a decision against her
supported by detailed findings of fact she deliberately chose to
retain the distinguished law firm to take an appeal to this Court.
Ms. Lehmer chose to have the decision below fully briefed and
argued in this Court and to delay execution of Floyd Webster's
judgment for four (4) and one half years.

The decision and opinion

of this Court was clearly forseeable in light of the circumstances
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and the findings of the trial court and it just will not do for
her now to regret those decisions and throw herself on the mercy
of the Court.

The opinion of this Court of which she complains is

the consequence of her actions and, regrettable as it may be, she
must be held fully accountable for them in the circumstances.
Nor is it proper for her now in her anger and regret to lash
out at the trial judge and accuse him of deciding the case below on
matters outside the record and improperly accuse him of bias because
of his supposed emotional preference for Floyd Webster.

(Petition

for Rehearing 2, 30). This is regrettable conduct on the part of
an officer of this Court.

Though she may be emotionally upset, it

nonetheless is clear that Mary Lehmer puts the blame for the
consequences of her actions on everyone except herself.
SCANDALOUS MATTERS
(Rule 24(k), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures, violation)
Not only does Ms. Lehmer lash out at the trial judge, but also
at one of the opposing counsel calling him "bizarre."

She then

attacks plaintiff, Floyd Webster, referring to him as "this wife
beater" and later stating, "As for being emotionally disturbed over
the death of his wife: it was common knowledge he used Alice for a
punching bag."

(Petition for Rehearing 10, 32).

She goes on, "He

couldn't have been suffering too much - depression on October 7, 1980,
over Alicefs death five years ago or he wouldn't have been in Mrs.
Dudley's bed...." (Petition for Rehearing 39). But even this is not
enough.

Resenting the Nymans who befriended Floyd Webster and

financially helped him reclaim his home (T. 1, 37), Ms. Lehmer pens
this scandalous assertion:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"When the Nymans took him into their home..,
and ensconced him in their midst and provided
for him in their midst and provided for him as
a member of the family (Fred died that August
and Floyd has shacked up with Arlene, who
provides for him, ever since....)11
(Mary Lehmerfs Petition for Rehearing 30-31).
She also belittles the work and services that she so freely utilized.
(P.F.R. 28).
These and other slanderous remarks are the conclusions of she
whose hand penned the Preface to the Petition for Rehearing, writing,
"Steal my purse, you steal my gold.

But steal my name, you steal

everything."
There is no competent evidence in the Transcript or any deposition
to support such conclusions.
professional or fair.

Those remarks in her Petition are not

They are akin to the bargain that resulted in

the trial court finding that, "The property had a potential fair
market value at the time of the transactions to the plaintiff and
his daughters of $240,000.00 to $400,000.00 which was contracted
away for the sum of $5000.00...."

(Finding #9).

Appellate courts deal with the evidence that is introduced at
trial and so does the trier of fact.

If Ms. Lehmer had wanted to

try her case in the above manner, she should have.

We would then

have had the opportunity to cross-examine and rebut.
The record speaks of Floyd.

He was well-known in Park City and

his reputation for truth and veracity was "very good."
This from Ms. Lehmer!s witness.

'T. 334).

Evidently the trial judge was also

impressed with Mr. Webster's candor.

His discerning eyes and ears

beheld a different man and perceived the circumstances different
than did Mary Lehmer.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS ::
Ms. Lehmer claims a concern for Floyd Webster:
"That was part of our decision, our plan, our
proposal. It was to see that he had a roof
over his head as long as he wanted it, was
that to have a roof over his head as long as
he would like it." (T. 258).

"We discussed buying his squatter's rights for
$5000.00 to make life more comfortable for him
while we guaranteed him a roof over his head."
(Petition for Rehearing 3 ) .
again,
"Our concern for the welfare of one when we
found ourselves in a position to help, have
all come to haunt me...." (Petition for
Rehearing 40).
If all this were true, why did she not accept the quiet request
of my letter of February 24, 1981?

(Ex. 23-D, see appendix for a

copy of said letter).
PETITION FOR REHEARING IMPROPERLY REFERS TO
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY THAT WAS NOT INTRODUCED AT TRIAL
In her Petition for Rehearing Mary Lehmer quotes extensively
from her pretrial depositions and those of Floyd Webster.
is manifestly improper.

This

It is hornbook law and well understood in

practice among trial lawyers that depositions are to be used at
trial only as stated in Rule 32 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure.
That is what the section is for.

Mary Lehmer seems to think that

because all of the depositions in the case were "published" they
are all in evidence at the trial.

5

But this would be contrary to
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Rule 32 which does not authorize such a procedure for admission
of deposition testimony.

For example, under Rule 32(a)(2) the

deposition of a party may be used by another party for any purpose
but this would not permit Ms. Lehmer to use her own depositions.
Nor would it permit her to use Floyd Websters except to the extent
it was actually used at trial.

Though she may use his deposition

for any purpose at trial, it still has to be "used" at trial.
Without such "use11 opposing counsel cannot know what evidence he
should place before the court to rebut or clarify.
She had distinguished and able trial counsel and the record
on appeal from that trial consists only of the record of that trial.
Such record does not include pretrial depositions that were not
utilized as evidence at the trial and thereby "used" at trial.
The reference to "published11 by counsel and the court below refers
to the unsealing and lodging of the depositions.

It does not mean,

as it cannot mean, that despite many days of trial testimony and
evidence the court considered all of the pretrial depositions in
reaching its decision rather than just those minor portions of them
that were actually used at trial.

The trial judge clearly did not

do so, nor could he have without a stipulation of counsel.

For one

thing, he would not have had time to do so between the end of trial
and his immediate pronouncement of decision complete with detailed
findings of fact.

Accordingly, Mary Lehmer is precluded from basing

her arguments to this court on sucu deposition testimony just as
surely as she is precluded from relying on her first person testimony
in the Petition—testimony that is not given under oath and is
unreferenced to the trial record below.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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PETITION FOR REHEARING RAISES NO NEW MATTER.
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED,
MODIFIED OR AMENDED AND THE PETITION SHOULD BE
DENIED.
Anger is not a substitute for evidence.

Nor is regret.

There

is no new matter raised in the Petition for Rehearing that has not
already been extensively briefed, argued and considered.

Mary

Lehmerfs argument regarding the value of the fee is a good example.
This point was in contention in the trial court and constituted a
principal argument by her counsel on appeal.

And her presentation

now at pp. 24-25 adds nothing to that argument.

To allow Mary Lehmer

to now attack the telling admission of her own expert witness at trial
regarding the market value of the fee is contrary to the proper
administration of justice.

She hired her attorneys to present that

expert witness and for the appeal to this court and those attorneys
have briefed and argued this point to the full extent permitted by
law.

This court has specifically decided this point against them

and Mary Lehmer and she must be bound by that decision.
She claims again too, for example, that there was no attorneyclient relationship between herself and Floyd Webster.

She argues

that in connection with the affidavit to terminate joint tenancy
that, "I put a charge of $25 down for preparing and recording it.
I in no way considered that this made me his attorney that day or
retroactively.

Completing such pre-printed forms is something

non-lawyer realtors do every day.11

(Petition for Rehearing 12).

But this is impermissible personal testimony in this court.

Mary

Lehmer has had her day to testify in court and she has utilized it.

7Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The trial judge has found against her.

There is nothing presented

by her to warrant the alteration of this court's opinion that/ "A
$25 attorney fee for drafting the affidavit was listed in Lehmerfs
records concerning Webster's property and was among the total fees
the trial court found Lehmer had paid in consideration for the
termination of Websterfs life estate."

Moreover, even if there had

not been an attorney-client relationship in the entire transaction
with Floyd Webster there surely was a confidential relationship
between the parties as defined in Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d at
769 (Utah 1985), in view of the "long established relationship of
trust" that existed here under all the facts and circumstances found
below and recited by this court in its detailed decision including
the previous legal advice given by Mary Lehmer to Floyd Webster and
his wife.
Another example of the rehashing of what has been previously
argued exhaustively is Mary Lehmer!s claim that Floyd Webster
ratified the contract ten (10) times over four (4) months.
(Petition for Rehearing 7-8).
misses the point.

The argument then, as before, totally

Floyd Webster consented to an unfair contract

because of Ms. Lehmerfs abuse of a confidential relationship and
for the other equally valid reasons for setting aside the contract
found by the trial court.

She has not met her burden of showing

that it was a iair contract.

Whether he "ratified" it one or ten

or more times before he became aware of its unfairness makes no
difference whatsoever.

Ms. Lehmer presented to the trial court

8
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no action taken by the Lehmers to their detriment that might
constitute an estoppel.

(Findings #12).
CONCLUSION

We do not again address all of the points raised by Ms. Lehmer
because we have already done so in our brief to this court.

If

it be necessary for this court to refresh its recollection, we
urge that plaintifffs original brief be reread.
events may have damaged Mary Lehmerfs reputation.

We regret that the
We regret too

that she entered into this transaction, that she did not rescind it
in February of 1981 or abide by the judgment of the trial court and
that Floyd Webster has had to wait six and one half years to have the
matter finally resolved.

We submit that the Petition for Rehearing

should be quietly denied.
Dated:

August 13, 1987

^C^rccic

IS J. SMEDLEY *
(xt(>rney for Appellee ^J
Floyd Webster
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JAMES J . SMEDLEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW

APPENDIX

3 Q NORTH MAIN STREET. SUITE 5
HEBER CITY, UTAH

84032

TKLKPHQNE 6 5 4 - 1 0 3 1

February 24, 19 81

Mr. and Mrs. Charles R. Lehmer
P.O. Box 626
Park City, Utah 84060
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Lehmer:
Floyd Webster has retained me for the purpose of requesting
permission to rescind a purported sales agreement of October 7,
1980, and December 21, 1980. He is rather depressed about this
matter and feels that he has sold far below the market value due
to his financial circumstances and the depression that he was under
in October of 1980. He has other items of concern, but primarily
the above sets out his feelings.
With this in mind, I am tendering to you the sum of $1256.20. This
covers the $356.20 paid to Park City and the $900.00 which has been
paid to him from time to time. I assume that you have some additional
out-of-pocket expenses for which he is willing to reimburse you.
It would be appreciated if you would look with favor upon him being
allowed to make restitution.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please let me
know.
Sirtc

DLEY
JJS:jt
Encl.
cc:

Floyd Webster
c/o Fred H. JNyman
95 North 300 West
Heber City, Utah 84032
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